

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 06269 01 OF 02 151745Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3120
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 6269

EXDIS DIST AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, IS, EG, US, XF
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS: APPROACHES TO DAYAN AND SADAT

REF: A) STATE 117795, B) CAIRO 12617, C) STATE 122733,
D) CAIRO 12619

1. DAYAN RETURNS FROM SCANDINAVIA LATE THURSDAY NIGHT, MAY 18. HE HAS BEEN ALERTED THAT I NEED TO SEE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS RETURN TO CONVEY THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (REF A). I SHOULD SEE HIM SOMETIME DURING THE DAY ON FRIDAY, MAY 19. THE ISRAELI CABINET WILL MEET ON SUNDAY, MAY 21, FOR A GENERAL DEBATE ON THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS WE HAVE PUT TO THE ISRAELIS. MY MEETING WITH DAYAN ON FRIDAY WILL SET THE STAGE FOR THAT CABINET MEETING.

2. RATHER THAN ENGAGE BEGIN IN A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE STATE OF PLAY BEFORE DAYAN'S RETURN, I ELECTED TO PASS TO HIM VIA EVRON THE BRIEF MESSAGE CONCERNING THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSALS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA CONTAINED IN PARA TWO OF REF A. I SAID THAT I DID NOT WISH TO TAKE UP A GREAT DEAL OF HIS TIME AT THIS POINT SO HAD NOT ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT. HOWEVER, I WANTED
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HIM TO KNOW THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE NOW DECIDED TO REFLECT FURTHER ON THEIR DRAFT BEFORE GIVING IT TO US, SO HE SHOULD NOT ANTICIPATE IT ARRIVING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. EVRON CONVEYED THIS MESSAGE TO BEGIN WHEN HE MET WITH HIM OVER THE WEEKEND. EVRON TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT BEGIN HAD ASKED HIM TO THANK ME FOR THE MESSAGE. "AND THAT HE HAD DULY NOTED IT." (WE HAVE INDICATIONS

TODAY THAT ONE OR MORE ISRAELI JOURNALISTS MAY BE ON THE POINT OF PUBLISHING A STORY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE US HAS BEEN SITTING ON THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL FOR A WEEK OR MORE AND HAS NOT DELIVERED IT. STORY COULD CERTAINLY NOT HAVE COME FROM US; ONLY POSSIBILITY IS THAT DAYAN SUSPECTS WE ALREADY HAVE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL AND HAS LET THAT WORD FLOAT ABOUT. IN ANY EVENT, IF QUERIED WE WILL SAY THAT WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN ASKED BY THE EGYPTIANS TO CONVEY ANY COUNTERPROPOSAL AS YET TO THE ISRAELIS.)

3. AS I SURVEY THE STATE OF PLAY AT THE MOMENT, I AM VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR OBTAINING SATISFACTORY REPLIES TO OUR QUESTIONS FROM THE CABINET MEETING NEXT SUNDAY. WILL PUT THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (REF A) TO DAYAN AS PERSUASIVELY AS POSSIBLE, BUT IT OBVIOUSLY FALLS CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF WHAT HE HAS SAID HE NEEDED IF HE WERE TO UNDERTAKE A MAJOR EFFORT WITH BEGIN.

4. IF, AS INDICATED IN REF C, HERMANN EILTS SEES SADAT BEFORE DEPARTING FOR WASHINGTON, I HOPE THAT HE MIGHT OBTAIN SOME ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL IN ARMING DAYAN FOR THE CABINET MEETING. IN THIS CONNECTION, WOULD APPRECIATE AN IMMEDIATE REPORT ON THE EILTS-SADAT CONVERSATION.

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5. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF TROUBLING ASPECTS OF SADAT'S COMMENTS TO EILTS AT THEIR LAST MEETING (REFS B AND D). MOST WORRISOME OF ALL IS THE NEWS THAT SADAT HAS NOW PROMISED NIMEIRI NOT TO ENGAGE IN ANY MORE DIRECT CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL IN CAIRO OR EGHPT ITSELF BETWEEN NOW AND WHENEVER AN ARAB SUMMIT CONVENES, AND THAT ANY SUCH FUTURE CONTACTS OUTSIDE EGYPT MUST BE PUBLICIZED. SINCE WE ARE WELL AWARE OF DAYAN'S VIEW OF KAMEL'S INSIGNIFICANT ROLE IN EGYPTIAN POLICYMAKING SADAT'S REMINDER THAT HE REMAINS PREPARED TO HAVE KAMEL MEET WITH DAYAN IN BUCHAREST WILL BE SEEN BY DAYAN AS A FLAT REBUFF AND HOPELESS SUGGESTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, I NEED GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE EIGHTH SUB-PARAGRAPH IN PARA ONE OF REF A. THE SECRETARY'S PROMISE TO TRY TO PERSUADE SADAT TO MEET WITH DAYAN IF DAYAN AND THE CABINET CAME UP WITH THE RIGHT ANSWERS IS THE ONLY VERY ENCOURAGING PART OF OUR MESSAGE FROM DAYAN'S POINT OF VIEW. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF SADAT'S STATEMENTS TO EILTS ABOUT FUTURE CONTACTS, I DO NOT WANT TO MISLEAD DAYAN ABOUT WHAT THE SECRETARY MIGHT BE ABLE TO PRODUCE IN THE WAY OF A SADAT MEETING. IT IS IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY THIS PART OF MY INSTRUCTION BEFORE I

SEE DAYAN.

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6. ONCE THE ISRAELIS FIND OUT THROUGH SOME MEANS, AS WILL INEVITABLY OCCUR AT SOME POINT, THAT WEIZMAN IS NO LONGER WELCOME IN EGYPT, THIS WILL BE READ HERE AS ONE MORE INDICATION THAT SADAT HAS WRITTEN OFF THE PEACE PROCESS WHILE MAINTAINING THE IMPRESSION FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION THAT HE WANTS TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE GOING, A FACADE PRIMARILY INTENDED FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFECT IN THE UNITED STATES. IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE STRONG PRESSURES ON WEIZMAN HERE TO PULL HIS STAFF OUT OF EGYPT AND THUS BREAK THE LAST THIN THREAD OF DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

7. ANOTHER VERY DISTURBING PART OF SADAT'S COMMENTS IS CONTAINED IN PARA THREE OF REF B. HE ASKS MUBARAK TO HAVE APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS READY TO PUT TO THE ISRAELIS WHEN THE ISRAELI QUESTIONS ARE FORMALLY PUT TO THE GOE. THIS APPROACH, RATHER THAN GETTING DOWN TO REAL NEGOTIATIONS OR TO THE SORT OF SECRET CONTACTS WITH DAYAN IS HOPING FOR, WILL HARDLY ADVANCE MATTERS HERE. FURTHERMORE, SADAT GIVES AS AN EXAMPLE THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE ISRAELIS "ARE READY TO DECLARE A WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW TO THE 1967 LINES PROVIDED ALL PARTIES AGREE TO SIT DOWN WITH ISRAELIS TO DISCUSS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS." SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAVE ANSWERED THIS QUESTION SEVERAL TIMES ALREADY IN THE NEGATIVE, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY,
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THIS HARDLY SEEMS LIKELY TO ADVANCE THE DIALOGUE.

8. FRANKLY, I HAVE LITTLE HOPE THAT THE ROUTE WE ARE ON OF TRYING TO GET CONDITIONAL COMMITMENTS FROM BOTH PARTIES AT THE SAME TIME IN ANSWER TO THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS HAS MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCESS. WHATEVER THE CONSTRAINTS OPERATING ON SADAT'S ABILITY TO ANSWER DAYAN'S QUESTIONS, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT DAYAN IS BEING ASKED HERE TO BRING BEGIN TO HEEL ON ONE OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN HIS IDEOLOGICAL POSITION CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY ON THE WEST BANK. HE WILL NEED MORE AMMUNITION THAN WE ARE PROVIDING HIM TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS. MY PESSIMISTIC PREDICTION IS THAT HE WILL MAKE AT BEST A HALF-HEARTED EFFORT, UNLESS I CAN BE AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE HIM WITH SOMETHING MORE PERSUASIVE, PARTICULARLY ON THE KEY QUESTION OF SADAT'S READINESS TO ACT RESOLUTELY FOR JORDAN IN NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA SHOULD HUSSEIN CONTINUE TO HANG BACK.
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